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An Empirical Analysis of Conservative, Liberal, 
and Other “Biases” in the United States Courts of 
Appeals for the Eighth & Ninth Circuits 
Robert Steinbuch* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The Supreme Court is, by definition, at the pinnacle of our federal 
system; therefore, many legal scholars properly focus their scrutiny on its 
actions and decisions. While this focus and scrutiny is warranted, academics 
should not ignore the importance of the federal courts of appeals, the courts 
of last resort for virtually all federal litigants.1 After all, 
[t]he decisions of the lower courts are rarely reviewed by the 
Supreme Court; [as such,] their decisions are effectively final. As a 
                                                          
*  Robert Steinbuch is a Professor of Law at University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 
William H. Bowen School of Law.  The  William H. Bowen School of Law provides 
summer stipends for academic research, such as the research conducted for this article.  
Steinbuch is a John M. Olin Law & Economics Fellow from Columbia Law School and 
graduated with a J.D. from Columbia Law School and a B.A. and M.A. from the 
University of Pennsylvania. He is a former clerk for the US Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit and a former attorney with the US Department of Justice, the Internal 
Revenue Service at the US Department of Treasury, and the US Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary. The author thanks Kim Love-Myers, Wenhui Sheng, Jaxk Reeves, Frances 
Fendler, Christian Turner, Bobby Bartlett, Pearl Steinbuch, Bart Calhoun, Hamilton 
Mitchell, Ashley Stepps, Matthew Swindle, Judson Taylor, JiEn Chen, and Jasper Xu for 
their contributions. The author also thanks the outstanding staff of the Seattle Journal for 
Social Justice, in particular Liberty Upton, James Edwards, Nissa Iversen, Ashley Morey, 
and Michael Biesheuvel for their fine work on this piece.  This article is the continuation 
in a series of research by the author beginning with Robert Steinbuch, An Empirical 
Analysis of the Influence of Political Party Affiliation on Reversal Rates in the Eighth 
Circuit for 2008, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 51 (2009), followed by Robert Steinbuch, Further 
Empirical Insights and Discussion of the Eighth Circuit, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 339 
(2011).  For the purpose of clarity for the reader, this article repeats some material found 
in those prior works. In addition, where applicable, the data was further updated and 
refined. 
1 CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 3 (2006). 
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result, the courts of appeals play an exceedingly large role both in 
settling disputes and determining the likely direction of the law. It 
is for this reason that the likely votes of lower court nominees have 
played a significant role in national debates.2 
Moreover, when investigating courts, including the federal courts of 
appeals, contemporary researchers should employ the investigatory tool 
appropriately adopted by other disciplines interested in scientific and 
testable theories—empirical analysis.3 Indeed, “[a] dearth of quantitative 
scholarship has been a serious shortcoming of legal research . . . [, and 
w]hen hypotheses cannot be tested by means of experiments . . . and the 
results assessed rigorously by reference to the conventions of statistical 
inference, speculation is rampant and knowledge meager.”4 Empirical 
research is posited on the belief that “[i]t is never easy to evaluate judges, or 
to evaluate their [anecdotal] evaluators, especially when those evaluators 
insist on anonymity . . . , [and given that] data on judicial performance exist, 
and although the data have problems as well, they provide a firmer basis for 
evaluation.”5 
                                                          
2 Id. 
3 See Robert Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis of the Influence of Political Party 
Affiliation on Reversal Rates in the Eighth Circuit for 2008, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 51 
(2009) [hereinafter Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis]; Robert Steinbuch, Further 
Empirical Insights and Discussion of the Eighth Circuit, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 339 (2011) 
[hereinafter Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights]. 
4 RICHARD A. POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL THEORY 411 (2001); see also ROBERT 
LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 4 (2009). 
There is some empirical evidence (as seems fitting to cite) that the use of 
empirical techniques for investigating law is the most discernible recent trend 
in legal scholarship. Law schools are now full of scholars who are less 
persuaded by argumentation and more persuaded by empirical evidence. We 
think the next generation of judges, lawyers, legislators, and other policy 
makers trained by these legal scholars will be similarly more persuaded by 
empirical results (footnote omitted). 
Id.; Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 339. 
5 Eric Posner, Judge Sonia Sotomayor: What the Data Show, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(May 13, 2009, 11:40 AM), http://volokh.com/posts/1242229209.shtml; see also 
Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 340; cf. Nicholas Wade, A 
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Quantitative legal scholarship, however, has not garnered universal 
appeal. For example, one academic echoing this sentiment wrote: 
I eschew empirical descriptions of how female judges are doing 
their jobs, taking a more anecdotal approach. . . . While it has 
become fashionable in legal academic circles for scholars to rely 
on or even conduct empirical research, there is much to be gained 
by other forms of knowledge. Cases tell stories.6 
Legal academics who shun quantitative examination in favor of finger-in-
the-air analyses often do so as a consequence of a lack of aptitude in the 
scientific approach of statistical analysis.7 But, “[r]efocusing legal 
scholarship on what the data actually shows, rather than fuzzy case studies 
or suppositions about testable realities, would help increase the likelihood 
of legal scholarship producing meaningful real world effects.”8 Fortunately, 
empirical analyses—such as the investigation that follows—are emerging as 
the critical tool for the advancement of legal research through the 
examination of, inter alia, judges.9 
In this paper, I continue to analyze the effect that several attributes of a 
trial judge have on whether the judge is reversed by a federal circuit court of 
appeals.10 I consider the political party of the trial judge, the gender of the 
trial judge, whether the trial judge was active or not (i.e., whether the judge 
                                                                                                                           
Decade Later, Gene Map Yields Few New Cures, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2010, at A1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/health/research/13genome.html?_ 
r=1&pagewanted=all#. “One can prefer to be an optimist or a pessimist, but the best 
approach is to be an empiricist.” Id. 
6 Theresa M. Beiner, Female Judging, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 821, 821–22 (2005); see also 
Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 340. 
7 See Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 351. 
8 Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Doctors, Duties, Death and Data: A Critical Review of 
the Empirical Literature on Medical Malpractice and Tort Reform, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
439, 441 (2006); see Tracy E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81 IND. L.J. 141 (2006). 
9 See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 4 at 172; see also Steinbuch, Further Empirical 
Insights, supra note 3, at 340. 
10 See Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 52–58; Steinbuch, Further 
Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 341–42. 
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was senior status with a reduced load), the number of appeals taken from 
the judge’s decisions that year, the type of cases appealed, and the 
interactions of the above factors.11 I conducted this analysis for the most 
liberal and the most conservative circuits with the hope of revealing some 
differences between them. Some expectations proved true, others did not, 
and still other unforeseen patterns emerged. Both the predicted and 
surprising patterns are informative, even assuming a lack of consensus on 
cause, because such patterns can frequently assist in predicting appellate 
outcomes.12 
II. EIGHTH AND NINTH CIRCUIT INVESTIGATIVE INQUIRY 
A. Choosing the “Right” and “Left” Circuits  
My primary (but not exclusive) inquest was to determine whether 
decisions of appellate courts are affected by the political makeup of the 
judges on those courts. As such, I sought to compare the most conservative 
and liberal circuits of the US Courts of Appeals. 
An analysis and comparison of the most polarized circuits would best 
demonstrate any party effect at the appellate level (i.e., greater level of 
reversal resulting from disparity between the party of the trial judge and the 
party of the appellate panel), because the less politically balanced the court, 
the lower the chances that intra-circuit, individual-panel decisions with 
opposing bias would offset each other in an aggregate analysis. That is, for 
example, if a court produced five liberally biased opinions and five 
conservatively biased opinions, a cumulative analysis would not well 
perceive any political bias. If, however, the political bias largely goes in one 
direction—i.e., if the individual panels are in phase politically—the bias is 
far more readily observed. To be clear, however, from the perspective of an 
                                                          
11 See Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 52–58; Steinbuch, Further 
Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 341–42. 
12 See Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 343. 
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individual undefined litigant—someone in the original Rawlsian position 
behind the veil of ignorance, one might say—the court with the offsetting 
biases is no better than the one with the apparent slant. Indeed, the latter 
situation may be better, a priori, because it at least offers predictability to 
litigants, which is absent from the former situation. 
In addition, the comparison of the most polarized circuits better reveals 
party effect at the appellate level, because, as discussed below, a 
phenomenon known as the “panel effect” causes panels on single-party 
dominated circuits to more greatly express political biases.13 Thus, choosing 
the most polarized circuits allows for the exploitation of this effect. 
It was relatively straightforward to select the most polarized opposing 
circuits. The Eighth Circuit is the most “right” circuit.14 It is composed 
overwhelmingly of judges affiliated with the Republican party. All but three 
were Republican at the time of the initial investigation (2008), and it has the 
most Republican judges (nine of its eleven active judges) of any US court of 
appeals.15 President George W. Bush appointed seven of them,16 and, to 
date, President Barack Obama has appointed none. As such, the appellate 
panels are almost invariably Republican dominated, if not entirely so.17 
The Ninth Circuit, in contrast, is the most “left” circuit—although it is 
not as far left as the Eighth Circuit is far right (I use the attitudinal model, 
described below, to determine this measurement). The Ninth Circuit has had 
slightly more than half of its judges appointed by Democratic presidents (57 
percent).18 
                                                          
13 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 83. 
14 See Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 349. 
15 Infinity Project: Talking Points, HUBERT H. HUMPHREY SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, 
http://www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/wpp/infinity/ (last visited May 25, 2012). 
16 Id. President Clinton appointed seven of the Second Circuit’s thirteen active judges. 
Id. 
17 See Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 349. 
18 Id.; LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 109 (2005). The Ninth Circuit might have had a larger 
percentage of Democratic appointees, but, 
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B. Eighth and Ninth Circuit Modeling 
This ongoing study is composed of three distinct elements. I began my 
study of the Eighth Circuit in 2008, and presented some preliminary 
findings shortly thereafter. I initiated the study of the Ninth Circuit in 2010, 
exclusively for this article—this data has never before been examined. And 
in 2011, I updated and expanded the data sets for the Eighth Circuit to 
obtain the latest available information for the most critical comparisons 
with the Ninth Circuit. 
In developing the initial model to test the likelihood of reversal in various 
circuits in light of literature in the field,19 I considered the party of the 
judge,20 whether the judge was active or not, the number of appeals taken 
from the judge’s decisions that year, the type of cases appealed, and the 
interactions of these factors.21 The gender variable was added later. 
                                                                                                                           
The Senate took twice as long to process Clinton’s nominees to the Ninth than 
it did for all of his appointees (five months versus ten months).  Conservatives 
in the Senate, [two researchers said], believed that ‘confirming Clinton 
nominees [to the Ninth] would have squandered a potential opportunity to 
reverse the liberal tilt of a precariously balanced court. 
Id. 
19  See, e.g., id. at 143–44; DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION 157–60 
(1997); RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 174 (2008); Stephen J. Choi & G. 
Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A Window into the Behavior of Judges?, 37 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 87 (2008); Harry Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of 
Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837, 837–38 (1991); Richard A. Epstein, 
The Independence of Judges: The Uses and Limitations of Public Choice Theory, 1990 
BYU L. REV. 827, 827–28 (1990); F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial 
Independence: Institutional Change in the State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 433–34 
(2004); Joanna M. Shepard, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 169, 171 (2009); Nancy C. Staudt, Modeling Standing, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
612, 614 (2004); see also Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 341; see 
generally SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1. 
20 See, e.g., EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18; KENNEDY, supra note 19; POSNER, supra 
note 19; SUNSTEIN, supra note 1; Choi & Gulati, supra note 19, at 87; Edwards, supra 
note 19, at 837; Epstein, supra note 19; Shephard, supra note 19; Staudt, supra note 19, 
at 79; see also Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 51. 
21 For example, my study analyzed the interaction of political party and the number of 
appeals taken from each judge to see whether any disparity in reversal rate that correlated 
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These investigative variables were chosen to examine the following 
primary and secondary questions: 
 Does the political identity of a trial judge correlate to 
how likely she is to be overturned?22 A positive 
correlation could be caused by a disparity in the view 
of the law, the view of the role of judges, and/or 
differences in world view between the trial judge and 
the appellate court.23 Indeed, the appellate court could 
be biased against judges of a particular political party, 
making them more likely to overturn district judges of 
the other party.24 
 Does a trial judge’s status as active or senior correlate 
to reversal rate?25 A positive correlation could be 
caused by a decreased competence of the trial judge 
incident to age.26 It could be caused by the appellate 
                                                                                                                           
to political affiliation of the trial judge could also be related to the fact that more appeals 
were taken from judges of one party. The data presented no such interaction. I did not 
include other factors in the regression analysis, such as who won at the trial level or 
whether the variable was highly collinear with my included factors (e.g., party 
affiliation). See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale 
of Waste and Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1585 (2008) (using this variable would 
result in multicollinearity, thereby undermining the study’s results). The best regression 
models are those in which the independent variables each correlate highly with the 
dependent variable, but correlate only minimally with each other. Such a model is often 
called “low noise” and will be statistically robust; in other words, it will predict reliably 
across numerous samples of variable sets drawn from the same statistical population. 
Statisticians and empiricists strive to eliminate multicollinearity in their studies. See 
LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 4, at 326 (discussing the risks of multicollinearity and the 
need to avoid it: “[t]he most obvious method of avoiding the problems associated with 
multicollinearity is to think carefully about the independent variables that you will 
include and not to include those that are likely to be collinear”) (emphasis added); see 
also Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 51; Steinbuch, Further Empirical 
Insights, supra note 3, at 342; cf. LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 4, at 236 (regarding the 
relevance of reporting determinations of no statistically significant correlation of 
examined factors). 
22 Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 52. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 53. 
26 Id. 
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court’s perceived decrease in competence of the trial 
judge incident to age.27 It could be caused by a 
different world view not reflected in political identity.28 
A negative correlation could be caused by an increased 
competence of the trial judge incident to age—or the 
appellate court’s perceived increase in competence of 
the trial judge incident to age.29 
 Does the number of appeals taken from the judge’s 
decisions correlate to reversal rate?30 A positive 
correlation could reflect the legal community’s 
understanding that the trial judge at issue is less 
competent than the norm.31 Thus, under this theory, 
lawyers would appeal these judges’ decisions more 
often, and the appellate court would reverse these 
judges more often.32 
 Does the case type taken on appeal—e.g., civil or 
criminal—correlate to reversal rate?33 A positive 
correlation might show a propensity of the appellate 
court not to intervene in one type of case over 
another.34 
Later, I added a gender variable to address this inquiry: Does the gender 
of a trial judge correlate to how likely she is to be overturned? A positive 
correlation could be caused by a disparity in the view of the law by gender 
and/or discrimination. 
Other variables were not considered to eliminate collinearity, and the 
interaction of the analyzed terms was studied.35 For example, I examined 
whether liberal trial judges’ decisions in criminal cases were more likely to 
                                                          
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 54. 
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be overturned than conservative judges’ decisions in criminal cases.36 A 
positive correlation could show a particular behavior by liberal trial judges 
in criminal cases that is disfavored by the appellate court, with no similar 
“disconnect” for civil cases.37 For instance, do Republican trial judges have 
a “law and order approach” in criminal cases more in line with the appellate 
courts’ view of this area of the law—a view which simply does not come 
into play in civil cases?38 
One question regarding these analyses is whether the reversal outcomes 
may be considered independent of the trial judges involved—in other 
words, whether or not there is a “judge effect.” Accordingly, mixed-effect 
model39 analyses were conducted that assumed a random effect of the trial 
judge on reversals; and while some of those results are included here for 
comparison, there was no empirical evidence for a judge effect. Results 
from fixed-effect models considering only the factors involved in the 
hypotheses, assuming independence of the outcome from the individual 
judges are also included, therefore. 
The inquiry conducted for the Ninth Circuit excepted the senior-status 
variable because this factor was quite small, and proved unavailing in the 
Eighth Circuit, and because the model was becoming over-parameterized, 
already requiring additional processing to filter out excess noise. 
                                                          
36 Id., at 54; see, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1585 (showing a 
correlation between political affiliation and ruling for or against a particular party). 
37 Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 54. 
38 Id. at 53. 
39 The mixed effects model is essentially a logistic regression analysis, but with an 
additional error term included to account for gender and title being measured at the level 
of the judge rather than the individual judgment. The logistic regression is used when 
predicting the probability of a particular event, in this case, the event that a decision is 
reversed. The odds of reversing a decision are compared based on various factors 
(gender, case type, etc.) and the model determines (through the use of P-values) whether 
the odds of reversal are significantly different for one type of case (or judge) than for 
another. 
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C. Adopting the Attitudinal Model for Judges’ Parties 
For the political party of each judge, I employed the attitudinal model 
(i.e., coded based on the party of the appointing president).40 
“The ‘attitudinal model,’ influential and well known in law and politics, 
attempts to explain judicial votes in . . . terms” of the political affiliation of 
judges.41 This model assigns the political affiliation to judges based upon 
the party of the appointing president.42 
This approach circumvents the intractable task of implementing an 
unbounded continuous variable for political party based on inherently 
subjective evaluations of philosophy.43 In fact, “the political affiliation of 
the appointing president actually provides a more interesting benchmark 
than ideology itself, assuming we could [even] obtain direct access to [the 
                                                          
40 See, e.g., JEFFERY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 64 (1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 86 (2002); Clermont & 
Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1585 (showing a correlation between political affiliation and 
ruling for or against a particular party, e.g., plaintiff or defendant); Cass R. Sunstein et 
al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 
VA. L. REV. 301, 302–03 (2004). 
Many people believe that political ideology should not and generally does not 
affect legal judgments, and this belief contains some truth. . . . It might be 
predicted that even when the law is unclear, ideology does not matter; the legal 
culture imposes a discipline on judges, so that judges vote as judges, rather 
than as ideologues. Or it might be predicted that in hard cases, the judges’ 
‘attitudes’ end up predicting their votes, so that liberal judges show 
systematically different votes . . . from those of conservative judges. . . . It is 
extremely difficult to investigate these questions directly. It is possible, 
however, to identify a proxy for political ideology: the political affiliation of 
the appointing president. Presidents are frequently interested in ensuring that 
judicial appointees are of a certain stripe. 
Id.; see also Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 56; Steinbuch, Further 
Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 342. 
41 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 5–6. 
42 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 5–6. 
43 See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 1585 (showing a correlation 
between political affiliation and ruling for or against a particular party, e.g., plaintiff or 
defendant); see also Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 54; Steinbuch, 
Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 342. 
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latter].”44 And, in any event, “the political party of the appointing president 
is a fairly good predictor of how individual judges will vote,”45 because “the 
decisions of judges . . . reflect the judges’ partisan affiliation, which just so 
happens to coincide often with that of their appointing president.”46 Studies 
have aptly demonstrated that despite the fact that “judges are supposed to 
‘rise above’ and ‘put aside’ . . . their partisan group affiliations,”47 
Republican appointees are more likely to uphold the 
interpretations of Republican administrations than those of 
Democratic administrations. Democratic appointees are more 
likely to uphold the interpretations of Democratic administrations 
than those of Republican administrations. . . . There is a definite 
“tilt,” on the part of federal judges, in the direction of 
administrations of the same political party as their appointing 
president.48 
Of course, this is no mere coincidence: “However loud the critics may be, 
the simple reality is that both the Senate and the president take into account 
nominees’ partisanship and ideology, in addition to their professional 
qualifications, when they make their decisions, and they always have.”49 In 
fact, “across the entire 135-year period, 92.5% of all 3,082 appointments to 
the lower federal courts (through 2004) have gone to candidates affiliating 
with the president’s party.”50 
D. The Logistic Model for Reversal 
A logistic model was used for binary response variable “reversal.” The 
response in each model is the logit of the probability of an appealed ruling 
being reversed, i.e., 




 p
p
1
ln
, where p denotes the probability of an appealed 
                                                          
44 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 7. 
45 Id. at 10. 
46 EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18, at 3 (emphasis added). 
47 KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 3. 
48 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 43. 
49 EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18, at 26. 
50 Id. 
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ruling being reversed, and {X1, …, Xk} denote the set of explanatory 
variables.51 
The logistic model is, 
kk XXp
p  



 1101ln  
Where, 
  kXX ,,1  = the intercept 
  k ,,1   = the regression coefficients 
 ln = the natural logarithm function 
The prediction equation is, 
     ,exp1
exp
,,|
110
110
1
kk
kk
k XX
XX
XXreversalP 


 
  
Where, 
 exp = the exponential function (1/ln) 
If 0  is significantly different from zero, X1 has a significant effect on 
the likelihood of reversal.52 
III. RESULTS—THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT 
A. Conclusions on the Eighth Circuit: Political Party Bias 
The primary Eighth Circuit study examined all of the appellate cases 
from that court of appeals for the 2008 calendar year.53 The full year 
ensured, inter alia, that disparity in reversal rates throughout the year would 
be captured. In other words, if appellate judges deliberated longer about 
reversing lower courts, reversing certain types of cases, or reversing based 
                                                          
51 See Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 59. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 55. 
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on, for example, political philosophy, these variations would all be reflected 
in the analysis. This data is presented in Tables 1.0-1.1. 
Table 1.0. Eighth Circuit—Reversals Based on Case Type 
(2008 Data) 
Total 
Appealed 
Civ. 
Appealed 
Crim. 
Appealed 
Total 
Reversed 
Civ. 
Reversed 
Crim. 
Reversed 
1068 488 580 192 94 98 
 
Table 1.1. Eighth Circuit—Reversals Based on Party     
(2008 Data) 
Total 
Appealed 
Dem. 
Appealed 
Repub. 
Appealed 
Total 
Reversed 
Dem. 
Reversed 
Repub. 
Reversed 
1068 457 611 192 100 92 
 
The conclusion of the Eighth Circuit empirical study for the 2008 data 
was a distinct, statistically significant correlation between a district court 
judge’s political affiliation and the rate at which the Eighth Circuit reversed 
the judge on appeal.54 Democratic trial court judges were reversed on appeal 
by the Eighth Circuit approximately one and a half times more often than 
district court judges affiliated with the Republican Party.55 
Of all of the variables considered, only the party variable showed a 
statistically significant correlation, as demonstrated in Table 1.2. Note that 
two p-values are presented for each variable. The first p-value presented is 
from a fixed-effects model that considers the outcomes of each judge’s 
appealed trials to be independent of one another. The second is from a 
mixed-effects model that assumes there is a random contribution of each 
judge to the probability of reversal, in addition to the other factors 
                                                          
54 Id. at 61; Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 342. 
55 See Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 61; Steinbuch, Further 
Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 342. 
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considered. This mixed model essentially considers trial results to be 
grouped by judge and takes into account that the variables title and party are 
properties of these judges. Both p-values are presented, as there was 
minimal evidence that the individual judges contributed to the variability in 
the probability of reversal (in each case, the covariance of the judges with 
respect to the logit response was not significantly different from zero). The 
AIC and BIC56 values presented are from the fixed-effects models only. 
Table 1.2.57 Logistic Regression Results for Probability of 
Reversal for All Appealed Cases 
Model Explanatory 
variables 
included 
P-value 
(fixed-
effects 
model) 
P-value 
(mixed-
effects 
model) 
AIC BIC 
1 Title 
(Senior) 
0.3123 0.3264 1009.113 1019.060 
2 Party 
(Democrat) 
0.0042 0.0086 1001.986 1011.933 
3 Total 
Appealed 
0.1131 0.1184 1007.577 1017.524 
4 Type 
(Criminal) 
0.3162 0.3214 1009.165 1019.112 
5 Party 
(Democrat) 
0.0132 0.0214 1006.155 1031.023 
Title 
(Senior) 
0.5093 0.4879 
Type 
(Criminal) 
0.5102 0.4626 
Total 
Appealed 
0.3280 0.3398 
 
                                                          
56 AIC stands for “Akaike Information Criteria.” BIC stands for “Bayesian Information 
Criteria.” These values are adjusted versions of the “likelihood” of the model—how 
likely it is that the model could produce the data at hand. Because of the adjustment, the 
lower the AIC and BIC, the more likely the model is to be able to produce the data. 
57 See Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 61; Steinbuch, Further 
Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 346. 
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The showing of a dramatic and statistically significant correlation 
between party affiliation and reversal rate most likely reveals that the 
judicial viewpoint of the largely Republican Eighth Circuit is more in line 
with the perspective of the Republican district judges when compared to 
their Democratic colleagues.58 As such, this study “provides [further] 
information on the relationship of what might be called ‘political ideology’ 
and judicial judgments.”59 
The visibility of this party effect is enhanced because the Eighth Circuit 
is overwhelmingly Republican—with nine Republicans amongst its eleven 
active judges during the initial study period (with President George W. 
Bush appointing seven of them).60 As such, the appellate panels were 
almost invariably Republican dominated, if not entirely so.61 
For “panels [that] are unified—a likelier event in periods in which a large 
majority of judges have been appointed by [p]residents of a single party—
we would expect to see much larger party differences.”62 Unified panel 
composition amplifies the ideological voting pattern, party effect of the 
mostly Republican Eighth Circuit because judges on an appellate panel tend 
to be influenced by the other judges on their panel—i.e., the “panel”63 or 
“whistleblower” effect.64 Thus, a panel made up of judges of all one party 
will not worry that a nonpartisan “whistleblower may be willing to expose 
the [remaining] majority’s deviant [decision-making] behavior by means of 
a dissent that might draw the attention of the high court and possibly lead to 
a reversal of the appellate court’s decision.”65 In fact, 
                                                          
58 See Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 61; Steinbuch, Further 
Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 346. 
59 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 4. 
60 Infinity Project: Talking Points, supra note 15; see Steinbuch, Further Empirical 
Insights, supra note 3, at 349. 
61 See Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 349. 
62 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 83. 
63 Id. at vii, 7, 10, 22–23, 45. 
64 EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18, at 117–18, 129. 
65 Id. at 118. 
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[a]mplification effects are so strong that if the data set in the 
relevant cases is taken as a whole, Democratic appointees sitting 
with two Democratic appointees are about twice as likely to vote in 
the stereotypically liberal fashion as are Republican appointees 
sitting with two Republican appointees. This is a far larger 
disparity than the disparity between Democratic and Republican 
votes when either is sitting with one Democratic appointee and one 
Republican appointee.66 
One group of researchers believes that this effect reflects the “pervasive 
process that leads like-minded people to go to extremes.”67 Regardless of 
the cause, the effect exists. 
Moreover, putting aside the panel effect for a moment, a more politically 
balanced court would also, at least partially, mask intra-circuit party effect, 
even if it was significant, because strongly Democratically “biased” panel 
decisions would be offset in the data by strongly Republican “biased” panel 
decisions. 
To slightly alter the sentiment of one academic (who was speaking about 
the effect of the political parties of the circuit judges that litigants on appeal 
encounter), “[t]he political affiliation of the appointing president [of trial 
judge within the Eighth Circuit] is hardly everything. But there can be no 
doubt that the litigant’s chances [on appeal to the Eighth Circuit] . . . are 
significantly affected by the luck of [this original] draw.”68 
For sure, the study alone does not propose that the Eighth Circuit 
consciously considers the political affiliation of the judge whose opinion is 
under review.69 More reasonably, the study validates the notion that judicial 
decision-making is a product of many factors, including judges’ political 
philosophies and the amplification (panel) effect.70 Two academics suggest 
that this effect is demonstrable because “[f]ederal judges . . . are more often 
                                                          
66 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 10. 
67 Id. at 86. 
68 Id. at 12. 
69  See Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 346. 
70 See id. at 346–47; Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 64–65. 
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than not ideological rather than principled decision makers, and ideological 
in ways that their nominating presidents would applaud.”71 Another posits 
that “an informed observer might [rightfully] be suspicious of the claim that 
legal discourse, and particularly legal policy argument, is autonomous from 
ideological discourse.”72 And while academics, jurists, and politicians, 
among others, disagree on whether any certain political philosophy should 
be disqualifying,73 the underlying idea that political philosophies do, in fact, 
affect how judges act is fortified through this research.74 
                                                          
71 EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18, at 119. 
72 KENNEDY, supra note 19, at 157. 
73 See also Robert Steinbuch, Bonding Justice, 80 MISS. L.J. 377, 385 n.9 (2010) (citing 
Peltz, infra); Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 347; cf. Richard J. 
Peltz, From the Ivory Tower to the Glass House: Access to De-Identified Public 
University Admission Records to Study Affirmative Action, 25 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 
181, 197 n.23 (2009) (discussing how a University of Arkansas at Little Rock, Bowen 
Law School administrator suggested that individuals with a certain political or 
philosophical preference should be excluded from certain decision-making positions). 
Compare CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE SUPREME 
COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 188 (2007). 
In this way, each and every justice has identified some set of values and 
principles that, in his or her view, deserve judicial protection. Values and 
principles of this kind, define a justice’s judicial philosophy. . . . When the 
president nominates a justice, the Senate must assess the nominee’s judicial 
philosophy and determine whether it is sound enough to warrant confirmation. 
Id., with Michael Saul, Supreme Court Nominee Sonia Sotomayor ‘Open,’ Will Follow 
Law on Abortion Issue, Says Friend, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 29, 2009, 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/2009/05/29/2009-05-29_supreme_court.html 
(“[Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor] will follow what she thinks is the law on 
that, and her personal beliefs will not interfere with that analysis because my view of her 
is that she does not allow her personal beliefs to interfere with her analysis of legal 
issues.”). 
74  See Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 347; see also Theodore A. 
McKee, Judges as Umpires, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1709 (2007); but see Michael A. 
Wolff, Law Matters: What Do Judges Believe . . . Really?, YOUR MO. CTS. (Feb. 27, 
2006), http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=1080. 
Court opinions are not personal beliefs. Supreme Court opinions are directed at 
one result: resolving a legal dispute. They do not necessarily reflect any 
judge’s personal views about the subject matter, nor are they pronouncements 
of political policy. A review of the Court’s opinions would show that decisions 
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While I have discussed the likely reason for the correlation, the benefit of 
the Eighth Circuit findings is that correlation itself is helpful, particularly 
regarding a factor out of the control of litigants.75 Correlation is often able 
to inform despite a lack of consensus on cause because it alone frequently 
aids in predicting appellate outcomes.76 In this situation, the previously 
described findings inform a litigant in the Eighth Circuit who lost in the 
district court that he has a better (albeit still not high) chance of winning on 
appeal if the trial judge was a Democrat.77 
Prediction of success is of paramount importance in the system 
for several reasons. In the course of litigation, lawyers constantly 
make strategic decisions and/or advise their clients on the basis of 
these predictions. Attorneys make decisions about future courses 
of action, such as . . . whether to advise the client to enter into 
settlement negotiations, and whether to accept a settlement offer or 
proceed to trial. Thus, these professional judgments by lawyers are 
influential in shaping the cases and the mechanisms selected to 
resolve them. Clients’ choices and outcomes therefore depend on 
                                                                                                                           
are based on laws enacted by the General Assembly, previous court decisions, 
court rules, constitutional provisions or other guiding legal authority. Different 
judges may differ on what a legal provision means or what legal principle 
controls a case. An individual judge may write a separate opinion dissenting or 
concurring with the opinion of the Court; there you may find an expression of 
one judge’s individual views about what a legal provision means or what legal 
principle should control. . . . Judges, as other citizens, have personal beliefs. 
When citizens come to courts to serve as jurors, we instruct them to set aside 
their persons beliefs and decide cases based on the law and the facts. The same 
is true for judges, who take an oath to do just that. 
Id. See generally EILEEN BRAMAN, LAW, POLITICS, AND PERCEPTION: HOW POLICY 
PREFERENCES INFLUENCE LEGAL REASONING (2009) (discussing how judges’ views 
affect outcomes in judicial decisions and how judges unconsciously find legal authority 
to support their preferences, while recognizing that some factors limit the judges’ ability 
to impose their personal views). 
75 Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 65; Steinbuch, Further Empirical 
Insights, supra note 3, at 343. 
76 Steinbuch, Further Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 343. 
77 Id. at 346. 
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the abilities of their counsel to make reasonably accurate forecasts 
concerning case outcomes.78 
Thus, an attorney considering whether to appeal to the Eighth Circuit 
should look at the party of the trial judge from whom the appeal is taken to 
aid in making a more accurate, critical prediction of success. And, all else 
being equal, an attorney in the Eighth Circuit should be more inclined to 
appeal decisions of Democratic district judges.79 
B. Gender Analysis of the Eighth Circuit 
The Eighth Circuit’s heavily Republican composition served to motivate 
an additional examination, conducted in 2011 (with 2008 data), of whether 
the gender of the appealed district judge correlates with reversal in that 
Court. Recall that the hypothesis behind the party-affiliation inquiry was 
that politically like-minded appellate judges would look more favorably on 
the decision-making of district judges with similar philosophies. Moreover, 
the theory posited that any political bias in the Eighth Circuit would be 
highly apparent because it would point in one direction—i.e., Republican. 
And, as discussed, that theory proved true. This conclusion prompted an 
analysis of gender bias because as Republican as the Eighth Circuit is, it is 
even more male. The Eighth Circuit has only one female judge, and she is a 
                                                          
78 Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict 
Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 134 (2010); see Steinbuch, Further 
Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 344. 
79 The study of the Eighth Circuit also disclosed that only nine out of the over sixty 
district judges in the Eighth Circuit were reversed for abusing their discretion more than 
once in 2008, which constituted over half of all of the reversals under the abuse of 
discretion standard by the Eighth Circuit in 2008. These judges are Judge Gary A. 
Fenner, Western District of Missouri; Judge Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., Western District of 
Missouri; Judge Jean C. Hamilton, Eastern District of Missouri; Judge Charles B. 
Kornmann, District of South Dakota; Judge Nanette K. Laughrey, Western District of 
Missouri; Judge James M. Rosenbaum, District of Minnesota; Judge Karen E. Schreier, 
District of South Dakota; and Judge William R. Wilson, Jr., Eastern District of Arkansas. 
The remaining minority abuse of discretion cases were shared by twenty-one judges. See 
Steinbuch, An Empirical Analysis, supra note 3, at 73–78, Table B; Steinbuch, Further 
Empirical Insights, supra note 3, at 349. 
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Democrat. The Eighth Circuit trails behind all other non-specialty circuits in 
appointing women. The data from 1995 through 2008 (the year of the 
original Eighth Circuit data analyzed herein) for male and female judges in 
the US courts of appeals is detailed below.80 However, notwithstanding the 
stark gender disparity, the gender variable had no effect. Thus, 
notwithstanding that the Eighth Circuit is extremely male-populated, it 
treats decisions from its diverse district courts the same, regardless of 
whether the trial judges are male or female. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
80 Infinity Project: Case Statement, HUBERT H. HUMPHREY SCH. OF PUB. AFFAIRS, 
http://www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/wpp/infinity/ (last visited May 25, 2012). In 1993, 
Judge Diana Murphy (at the request of the Eighth Circuit’s chief judge) organized and 
appointed a gender task force for the Eighth Circuit. Id. The task force calculated that the 
Eighth Circuit mostly employed women. Id. Women held 73 percent of the staff 
positions; 65 percent of management positions were occupied by men. Id. And, as 
discussed, Eighth Circuit judges were, save one, all male. Id. 
The Infinity Project [views . . . t]he existence of only one female judge on the 
Eighth Circuit bench in unacceptable in light of the significant number of 
qualified women and the situation should be remedied as soon as possible. . . . 
The infinity Project believes it is necessary to have a bench that reflects the 
society as a whole in order that judicial decisions reflect public policy that 
takes into account differing life experiences and points of view. 
Id.; Lisa Montpetit Brabbit, Infinity Project Seeks to Close the Gender Gap on the 8th 
Circuit, ST. THOMAS LAWYER (Winter 2009), http://www.stthomas.edu/lawmagazine/ 
2009/Winter/Infinity.html. 
The Infinity Project, created in 2008, sees the gender gap . . . as a judicial 
tragedy demanding both attention and action. The Infinity Project is a coalition 
of lawyers, scholars, community leaders and organizations working to increase 
the gender diversity of the federal bench to ensure the quality of justice in the 
8th Circuit. 
Id. 
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Table 2.0. Male and female appointments in all United States 
Courts of Appeals from 1995–2008 
Circuit Female 
Appointments 
 
Male 
Appointments 
First 1 2 
Second 2 6 
Third 1 9 
Fourth  1 5 
Fifth 3 4 
Sixth 4 7 
Seventh  3 2 
Eighth 0 9 
Ninth 6 14 
Tenth 1 8 
Eleventh 0 4 
District of     
Columbia 1 3 
 
Only the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits had no female appointments 
during the relevant time period. The Eighth Circuit had nine male 
appointments, while the Eleventh had only four. Moreover, a large portion 
of the district judges in the Eighth Circuit was also male. Such a stark 
bifurcation on both courts should allow any gender-based reversal 
correlation, if one exists, to be readily apparent. Consequently, I added a 
gender variable and re-ran the 2008 Eighth Circuit analysis. The data 
follows. 
Tables 2.1–2.2 show that a somewhat larger proportion of district judges 
in the Eighth Circuit were appointed by Republican presidents than 
Democratic presidents, and that over 85 percent of district judges in the 
Eighth Circuit sample are male. 
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Table 2.1. Frequency Table of Political Parties for District 
Judges in the Eighth Circuit 
Party Frequency Percent 
R 40 58.82 
D 28 41.18 
Total 68 100.00 
 
Table 2.2. Frequency Table of District Judges’ Genders in 
the Eighth Circuit 
Gender Frequency Percent 
F 10 14.71 
M 58 85.29 
Total 68 100.00 
 
However, this data includes six male judges (three Democratic and three 
Republican) who did not have any rulings appealed during the examined 
time period. So Tables 2.1 and 2.2 are recalculated below based only on 
judges included in the analysis. These results are shown in Tables 2.3 and 
2.4, respectively. 
Table 2.3. Frequency Table of Appointing Political Parties 
for District Judges in the Eighth Circuit, Appealed Judges 
Only 
Party Frequency Percent 
R 37 59.68 
D 25 40.32 
Total 62 100.00 
 
Table 2.4. Frequency Table of Genders of District Judges in 
the Eighth Circuit, Appealed Judges Only 
Gender Frequency Percent 
F 10 16.13 
M 52 83.87 
Total 62 100.00 
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Finally, the combination of gender and party traits is examined below. 
Table 2.5 indicates the number and percentage of district judges with 
appealed cases in the Eighth Circuit sample from each gender and political 
party. Table 2.6 indicates the number and percentage of appealed rulings of 
district judges in the Eighth Circuit sample by gender and political party. 
Table 2.5. Frequencies and Percentages of District Judges in 
the Eighth Circuit by Gender and Political Party 
Table of Gender by Party 
 Party 
 Dem. Rep. Total 
Female 
 
4 
6.45% 
6 
9.68% 
10 
16.13% 
Male 
 
21 
33.87% 
31 
50.00% 
52 
83.87% 
Total 25 
40.32% 
37 
59.68% 
62 
100.00% 
 
Table 2.6. Frequencies and Percentages of Analyzed 
Appealed Rulings by Gender and Political Party 
Table of Gender by Party 
 Party 
 Dem. Rep. Total 
Female 
 
71 
6.65% 
165 
15.45% 
236 
22.10% 
Male 
 
386 
36.14% 
446 
41.76% 
832 
77.90% 
Total 457 
42.79% 
611 
57.21% 
1068 
100.00%
 
Table 2.5 indicates that the largest percentage of judges in the sample is 
composed of male Republicans (50.00%) and the smallest percentage of 
judges in the sample is composed of female Democrats (6.45%). Table 2.6 
demonstrates a similar distribution of appealed rulings, though the 
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percentage of rulings appealed for female Republican judges is somewhat 
higher than the percentage of female Republican judges in the sample. 
Table 2.7 indicates the average number of appealed rulings per judge of 
each gender and appointed by each political party. 
Table 2.7. Average Number of Appealed Rulings per Judge 
by Gender and Political Party 
Table of Average Number of 
Appeals per Judge 
Gender Party 
 D R Total 
F 17.7 27.5 23.6 
M 18.4 14.4 16.0 
Total 18.3 16.5 17.2 
 
Table 2.7 shows that there are 17.2 rulings on average appealed per judge 
in this sample. That number varies from an average of 14.4 appealed rulings 
per male Republican-appointed judge to 27.5 appealed rulings per female 
Republican-appointed judge. This variation in number of appealed rulings is 
much larger than the variation in number of appealed rulings in the Ninth 
Circuit, but the Eighth Circuit has fewer district judges, so there will 
inherently be more variation in the averages. 
Table 2.8 indicates that even after the addition of the gender variable, the 
Democratic indicator remains the only variable correlating with reversal. 
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Table 2.8. Logistic Regression Results for Probability of 
Reversal for All Appealed Cases 
Model Explanatory 
Variables 
P-value 
(fixed-
effects 
model) 
P-value 
(mixed-
effects 
model) 
AIC BIC 
1 Party (Democrat) 
0.0042 0.0086 1001.986 1011.933 
2 Gender (Female) 
0.1069 0.3719 1007.439 1017.386 
3 Type  (Criminal) 
0.3162 0.3214 1009.165 1019.112 
4 Total  Appealed 
0.1131 0.1184 1007.577 1017.524 
5 Title  (Senior) 
0.3123 0.3264 1009.113 1019.060 
6 
Party 
(Democrat) 
0.0249 0.0268 1006.702 1036.543 
Gender 
(Female) 
0.2351 0.2375 
Type  
(Criminal) 
0.4888 0.4902 
Total  
Appealed 
0.5166 0.5178 
Title  
(Senior) 
0.3700 0.3719  
 
And Table 2.9 indicates that, even after the addition of the gender 
variable, there are no significant interactions for any of the variables. This 
table is presented for the fixed-effects model, but similar results were found 
for the mixed-effects model. Thus, while an attorney considering whether to 
appeal to the Eighth Circuit should look at the party of the trial judge from 
whom the appeal is taken to aid in making more accurate the prediction of 
success, none of the other investigated factors are useful for such analysis. 
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Table 2.9. Variable Interactions 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter DF Estimate StandardError 
Wald 
Chi-Square P-value 
Intercept 1 -1.0907 0.3513 9.6403 0.0019 
Status 1 -0.7538 0.5193 2.1069 0.1466 
Democrat 1 -0.0372 0.4147 0.0081 0.9284 
Criminal 1 -0.7101 0.4420 2.5806 0.1082 
TotAppealed 1 -0.0342 0.0315 1.1780 0.2778 
Democrat*Criminal 1 -0.0666 0.3526 0.0357 0.8502 
Democrat*TotAppealed 1 0.0329 0.0302 1.1844 0.2765 
Criminal*TotAppealed 1 0.0407 0.0267 2.3345 0.1265 
Status*Democrat 1 0.4350 0.5570 0.6099 0.4348 
Status*Criminal 1 0.4364 0.4803 0.8256 0.3636 
Status*TotAppealed 1 0.0303 0.0418 0.5250 0.4687 
Status*Female 0 0 . . . 
Democrat*Female 1 0.0390 0.4091 0.0091 0.9240 
Criminal*Female 1 0.4751 0.4233 1.2595 0.2617 
TotAppealed*Female 1 -0.0301 0.0239 1.5837 0.2082 
 
III. RESULTS—THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
Like the study of the Eighth Circuit, this investigation sought to 
determine whether the political party of the appointing president, gender of 
the judge, type of case, number of cases appealed, or some combination of 
these factors influences the likelihood that a case would be reversed on 
appeal. 
The 2010 data contains records of 169 district judges in the Ninth Circuit. 
Each district judge was scored according to his or her political party (using 
the same attitudinal model that relies upon the party of the appointing 
president), gender, the number of cases appealed, and the case type. These 
variables were run in a logistic regression model to determine whether they 
can aid in predicting the probability of an appealed ruling being reversed. 
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While the Ninth Circuit data showed a correlation between case type and 
reversal, an analysis of the case type indicates that an attorney should not 
consider this factor when deciding whether to appeal because the results are 
deceptive. 
A. Ninth Circuit Background Data 
Table 3.0 demonstrates that in the Ninth Circuit dataset there are a total 
of 2610 cases, 544 of which have been reversed. While only 186 out of 
1315 criminal cases were reversed, 356 out of 1295 civil cases were 
reversed. 
Table 3.0. Case-Type and Reversal Totals  
Cases 
Appealed 
Crim. 
Cases 
Civ. 
Cases 
Total 
Reversed 
Crim. 
Reversed 
Civil 
Reversed 
2610 1315 1295 544 186 358 
 
Table 3.1 shows that the Ninth Circuit has slightly more Republican 
district judges than Democratic district judges. 
Table 3.1. Frequency of District Judge Appointing Political 
Parties 
Party Frequency Percent 
R 97 57.40 
D 72 42.60 
Total 169 100 
 
Table 3.2 demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit has far more male district 
judges than female district judges. 
Table 3.2. Frequency Table of Judges’ Genders 
Gender Frequency Percent 
F 38 22.49 
M 131 77.51 
Total 169 100 
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Overall, these tables signify that a somewhat larger proportion of district 
judges in the sample were appointed by Republican presidents, and that 
over 75 percent of judges in the sample are male. Note, however, that in this 
sample there are six female district judges appointed by Democratic 
President Obama who have not had any rulings appealed because not 
enough time has passed since their appointments. Because they have had no 
rulings appealed, they were not included in the analysis. Accordingly, 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 are recalculated based only on judges who will be 
included in the analysis. The results are as follows: 
Table 3.3. Frequency Table of Appointing Political Parties, 
Appealed Judges Only 
Party Frequency Percent 
R 97 59.51 
D 66 40.49 
Total 163 100 
 
Table 3.4. Frequency Table of Judges’ Genders, Appealed 
Judges Only 
Gender Frequency Percent 
F 32 19.63 
M 131 80.37 
Total 163 100 
 
The next tables look at the combination of these two traits. Table 3.5 
indicates the number and percentage of judges with appealed cases in the 
sample from each gender and political party. Table 3.6 indicates the number 
and percentage of appealed rulings in the sample from each gender and 
political party. 
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Table 3.5. Frequencies and Percentages of Judges in Sample 
by Gender and Political Party  
Table of Gender by Party 
 Party Total 
Gender D R  
F 
23 
(14.11%)
9 
(5.52%) 
32 
(19.63%) 
M 
43 
(26.38%)
88 
(53.99%)
131 
(80.37%) 
Total 
66 
(40.49%)
97 
(59.51%)
163 
(100.00%)
 
Table 3.6. Frequencies and Percentages of Appealed Rulings 
in Sample by Gender and Political Party 
Table of Gender by Party 
Gender Party Total 
 D R  
F 
385 
(14.75%)
131 
(5.02%) 
516 
(19.77%) 
M 
713 
(27.32%)
1381 
(52.91%)
2094 
(80.23%) 
Total 
1098 
(42.07%)
1512 
(57.93%)
2610 
(100.00%)
 
Table 3.5 indicates that the largest proportion of district judges in the 
sample is male Republicans (53.99%), and that the smallest proportion of 
district judges in the sample is female Republicans (5.52%). Table 3.6 
demonstrates a similar distribution of appealed rulings. The last table, Table 
3.7, indicates the average number of appealed rulings per judge, according 
to gender of the judge and political party of each appointing president. 
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Table 3.7: Average Number of Appealed Rulings per Judge by 
Gender and Political Party 
Table of Average Number of Appeals per Judge
 Party Total 
Gender D R  
F 16.7 14.6 16.1 
M 16.6 15.7 16.0 
Total 16.6 15.6 16.0 
 
Table 3.7 indicates that, overall, the average number of appealed rulings 
per judge is sixteen. That number varies from an average of 14.6 appealed 
rulings per female, Republican-appointed judge to an average of 16.7 
appealed rulings per female, Democrat-appointed judge. 
B. Conclusions of Ninth Circuit Data: Case-Type Bias 
In the presence of all other variables in the Ninth Circuit, the case type 
indicator (i.e., criminal or civil) was the only significant one. Thus, in 
statistically significant terms, the Ninth Circuit is less likely to reverse a 
criminal appeal than a civil appeal. Table 4.1 shows this result. 
Table 4.1: Logistic Regression Results for Probability of 
Reversal for All Appealed Cases81 
Model 
Number 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Included 
P-value 
(fixed-
effects 
model) 
P-value 
(mixed-
effects 
model) 
AIC BIC 
1 Party 
(Democrat) 
0.4433 0.4219 2675.361 2687.095 
2 Gender 
(Female) 
0.3675 0.3744 2675.148 2686.882 
                                                          
81 Typically, a P-value of 0.05 or less is said to indicate that a variable is a significant 
predictor of the probability. AIC and BIC are model fit criteria; for both of these criteria, 
a smaller value indicates a better fit of the model to the data. 
An Empirical Analysis of Conservative, Liberal, and Other "Biases" 247 
VOLUME 11 • ISSUE 1 • 2012 
3 Type 
(Criminal) 
< 0.0001 <0.0001 2602.908 2614.642 
4 Total 
Appealed 
0.8426 0.9942 2675.911 2687.646 
5 Party 
(Democrat) 
0.2231 0.2242 2607.179 2636.514 
Gender 
(Female) 
0.3757 0.3764 
Type 
(Criminal) 
< 0.0001 <0.0001 
Total 
Appealed 
0.8450 0.8451 
 
The analysis in Table 4.2 indicates no interactions between any pair of 
predictor variables. This table is presented for the fixed-effects model, but 
similar results were found for the mixed-effects model. 
Table 4.2: Interaction of Terms 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Parameter DF Estimate Standard
Error 
Wald 
Chi-Square
P-value 
Intercept 1 -0.8662 0.1824 22.5553 <.0001 
Female 1 -0.5553 0.4188 1.7580 0.1849 
Democrat 1 -0.4274 0.3016 2.0091 0.1564 
Criminal 1 -0.7545 0.2537 8.8470 0.0029 
TotAppealed 1 -0.00061 0.00755 0.0066 0.9352 
Female*Democrat 1 0.2595 0.2985 0.7558 0.3846 
Female*Criminal 1 0.1660 0.2698 0.3785 0.5384 
Democrat*Criminal 1 0.1779 0.2211 0.6475 0.4210 
Female*TotAppealed 1 0.0211 0.0178 1.4072 0.2355 
Democrat*TotAppealed 1 0.00752 0.0112 0.4531 0.5009 
Criminal*TotAppealed 1 -0.00810 0.0101 0.6420 0.4230 
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The case type indicator is a highly significant predictor of reversal (P-
value < 0.0001), and the best model contains only the criminal indicator. 
By inverting the logit response of the model, we see that 14.14% of 
appealed criminal cases and 27.64% of appealed civil cases were reversed. 
Thus, the odds of a criminal case being reversed is estimated to be only 
0.431 times the odds of a civil case being reversed; the 95 percent 
confidence interval range is 0.354–0.525. In other words, the Ninth Circuit 
is twice as likely to reverse a civil case as a criminal case. 
C. Basis for Lower Reversal Rate for Criminal Cases 
Likely, more criminal cases were affirmed because higher rates of 
criminal cases properly decided at the trial level were appealed. Criminal 
defendants, often in jail with free attorneys, have virtually nothing to lose 
by appealing: 
Unlike in the civil context, criminal defendants will appeal even 
when the law is fairly clearly against them, because (with rare 
exceptions) they are not paying for the appeal. Because their 
liberty is on the line, and because economic incentives do not 
discipline appeals, convicted criminals will often seek appellate 
review even if it is most unlikely that they will prevail. As a result, 
most criminal appeals lack merit.82 
In civil cases, in contrast, appellants must conduct cost-benefit analyses. 
Because they are paying their attorneys, the resolution of their cases almost 
always has monetary implications. So, only better cases (in terms of 
likelihood of reversal) are appealed in the first place.83 
To test this hypothesis, I investigated whether there was a higher quantity 
of civil cases than criminal cases filed at the district level. An affirmative 
finding would support my hypothesis because Table 3.0 showed us that 
virtually the same numbers of civil and criminal appeals were filed in the 
                                                          
82 SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 61. 
83 Id. 
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Ninth Circuit. And, in fact, Table 5.1 supports my hypothesis by showing 
that there were far more civil cases at the trial level than there were at the 
appellate level in the Ninth Circuit. The contrasting, near-even number of 
appeals between civil and criminal cases leads to the conclusion that 
litigants exercise greater selectivity when appealing civil cases than when 
appealing criminal cases. 
Table 5.1: Civil and Criminal Cases Filed in Each District in 
the Ninth Circuit for the Data Set Year and the Two Years 
Prior 
 2010 2009 2008 
Ninth Circuit 
Districts 
Civil Crim. Civil Crim. Civil Crim. 
Alaska  492 141 382 127 361 135 
Arizona  3875 5875 3629 4263 3529 2995 
Cal Central  14334 1247 13607 1430 12130 1761 
Cal East  5818 799 5698 807 4807 836 
Cal North  6170 685 6059 888 6175 575 
Cal South  3007 5046 3175 4728 2650 3995 
Guam  35 50 35 39 22 51 
Hawaii  791 163 622 162 578 206 
Idaho  665 267 864 268 576 263 
Montana  530 321 621 346 610 398 
Nevada  3162 662 3326 544 2588 359 
N. Mariana 
Islands  31 18 54 17 46 17 
Oregon  2266 661 2158 640 2239 668 
Washington East  792 384 706 348 650 349 
Washington 
West  2975 408 2720 506 2938 488 
Total    44943 16727 43656 15113 39899 13096 
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As can be seen, in 2010 and in the two years prior, roughly three civil 
trial-level cases were filed for each criminal trial-level case. The Ninth 
Circuit, however, decided virtually the same number of criminal and civil 
cases in 2010 (Table 3.0). Thus, approximately one in eleven criminal cases 
were appealed, while only one in thirty-three civil cases were appealed. 
Accordingly, as the theory presented here suggests, litigants in civil cases 
were three times more selective in appealing than litigants in criminal cases 
were. And, as the data show, the Ninth Circuit was significantly more 
selective in reversing criminal cases than civil cases. Given the discussed, 
underlying basis for such heightened discrimination, the case type factor 
will not serve as a useful predictor for would-be litigants. 
IV. COMPARISON OF EIGHTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS 
A. Comparison of Eighth and Ninth Circuits on Case-Type Effect 
While the Ninth Circuit was significantly more selective in reversing 
criminal cases when compared to civil cases, we did not see this 
phenomenon with the 2008 Eighth Circuit data. Several theories can be 
presented for why the 2008 Eighth Circuit data contrasts from the Ninth 
Circuit data in this respect. 
First, perhaps criminal defendants in the Eighth Circuit (and/or their 
counsel) were more discriminating in appealing. A higher selectivity rate 
could represent a better filtering of cases not worthy of reversal. Table 5.2, 
however, refutes such hypothesis. 
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Table 5.2: Civil and Criminal Cases Filed in Each District in 
the Eighth Circuit for the Data Set Year and the Two Years 
Prior 
Eighth Circuit      2008 2007 2006 
Districts Civil Crim. Civil Crim. Civil Crim. 
Eastern District 
of Arkansas  4723 338 2063 313 2987 345 
Western District 
of Arkansas  860 196 803 217 848 191 
Northern District 
of Iowa  551 539 549 306 551 391 
Southern District 
of Iowa  765 352 779 434 845 327 
District of 
Minnesota  6186 341 5412 367 4714 386 
Eastern District 
of Missouri  2250 778 2414 785 2455 837 
Western District 
of Missouri  2013 574 2037 611 2401 664 
District of 
Nebraska  751 607 891 570 1086 539 
District of North 
Dakota  267 205 203 213 211 244 
District of South 
Dakota  342 453 418 430 418 391 
Total 18708 4383 15569 4246 16516 4315 
 
The rate at which criminal defendants in the Eighth Circuit pursued 
appeals was actually above that of criminal defendants in the Ninth Circuit. 
In 2008 and the two years prior, roughly four civil cases were filed in 
district courts for every criminal case. After applying the data from Tables 
1.0–1.1, we see that approximately one in eight criminal cases was appealed 
and one in thirty-five civil cases was appealed to the Eighth Circuit. 
Accordingly, litigants in civil cases were over four times more selective 
than litigants in criminal cases in appealing. And, more importantly, 
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litigants in the Eighth Circuit were more selective in appealing civil cases 
and less selective in appealing criminal cases than those in the Ninth 
Circuit. Thus, the theory that criminal defendants in the Eighth Circuit 
(and/or their counsel) were more discriminating in appealing must be 
rejected. 
Another possible explanation for the disparity between the Eighth and the 
Ninth Circuits regarding the correlation of reversal to case type is that the 
reversal rate for criminal cases in the Eighth Circuit during 2008 was 
simply anomalous. The available, but more limited, data from 2011 gives 
some support to this hypothesis. 
The 2008 data for the Eighth Circuit showed a 19 percent greater reversal 
rate for civil cases than criminal cases, but the correlation did not prove 
statistically significant. The data from January through July of 2011 showed 
a different distribution. This partial year 2011 data showed that from 
January to July, 2011, of the 217 civil cases appealed, thirty-nine were 
reversed (17.97%); and of the 307 criminal cases appealed, twenty-five 
were reversed (8.14%). This very large difference in reversal rate by type of 
case (criminal versus civil) was also statistically significant. In comparison, 
the 2010 data for the Ninth Circuit showed a 95 percent greater likelihood 
of reversal for civil cases than for criminal cases, which was also 
statistically significant. 
Coupling these findings with the total number of civil and criminal cases 
appealed in each data set, we see the Ninth Circuit intervening in the 
decisions of trial judges more frequently than the Eighth Circuit. To the 
extent that the oft-heard critique of the Ninth Circuit—that it is an “activist” 
Circuit—refers to how often the appellate court intervenes in the decisions 
of trial judges, then the above data provides evidence in support of that 
claim.84 
                                                          
84 EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 18, at 191 (explaining that sometimes “activist” is used 
as a synonym for “liberal,” as the Ninth Circuit has, overall, produced the most liberal 
decisions of the courts of appeals). 
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B. Comparison of Eighth and Ninth Circuits on Political-Party Effect 
While we saw a clear correlation in the 2008 Eighth Circuit data between 
the party of the trial judge and reversal, the data set for the Ninth Circuit 
data showed no political-party effect. Interestingly, however, the new, 
preliminary 2011 data from the Eighth Circuit also did not show a 
statistically significant correlation between reversal and party of the trial 
judge. And the actual difference for the data set was small, irrespective of 
significance. However, the data analyzed from 2011 initially ended with 
cases from July. Given the close reversal rate by party, I hypothesized that 
the data from August and September might be particularly important, 
because the Eighth Circuit, like most others, does not hear cases in July and 
August. As such, August effectively becomes the end of the Court’s term. 
And it is often during August and September that judges play “catch up.” 
They frequently finish the year’s remaining cases during those months. 
Perhaps, I postulated, some of the more difficult cases—those that require 
the exercise of judgment concerning judicial and political philosophy, rather 
than the routine application of basic legal principles—get pushed off by 
judges until this time. Furthermore, judicial clerks typically leave during 
August. Clerks will sometimes push off the more complex cases until the 
end of the session as well. As such, I sought to investigate whether August 
and September would alter the initial Eighth Circuit results, which did not 
show much of a difference in reversal rates for Democratic versus 
Republican trial judges. 
Testing the “end-of-cycle” hypothesis by analyzing the additional 2011 
Eighth Circuit data from August and September 2011 produced some 
interesting results. Republican trial judges were reversed during this period 
17.71% of the time, while Democrat district judges were reversed 26.23% 
of the time. Thus, during this period, the Eighth Circuit again reversed 
Democratic district judges approximately 50 percent more often than 
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Republican trial judges. When this data is combined with the January–July 
2011 data for the Eighth Circuit, we still see the Eighth Circuit reversing 
Democrats 15 percent more often than Republicans. However, these 
samples were not sufficient to conclude that the differences are statistically 
significant, and, as a consequence, further study is needed. 
Additionally, I conducted a logistic regression of the January–September 
2011 data for the Eighth Circuit that included party and time. The analysis 
showed an effect for the time factor. Thus, reversal rates were significantly 
different between the January–July 2011 data and the August–September 
2011 data—with that higher rate, as seen, occurring in the later timeframe. 
This evidence supports my hypothesis that the Eighth Circuit changes its 
behavior during the “catch-up” months. 
In addition, we must at least consider the effect of my having previously 
shared my conclusions from the 2008 Eighth Circuit data with the Eighth 
Circuit. It is possible that this had some effect on the 2011 data, as well. 
Future study of cases from additional years for the Eighth Circuit will 
further clarify these conclusions. Putting aside the partial 2011 data due to 
the fact that the greater reversal rate of Democrats needs further study, 
however, the 2008 Eighth Circuit data nonetheless represents a real 
political-party effect phenomenon not seen in the Ninth Circuit. This is 
likely a function of the fact that the Ninth Circuit has a much closer 
distribution of Democratic and Republican appellate judges (57 percent 
Democratic). Therefore, even if, arguendo, the panels somehow were all 
Democratic or Republican, they would largely cancel each other out in the 
collective analysis performed herein. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit panels 
simply were often not party unified (i.e., all Democrat or Republican). As 
such, the previously discussed panel effect moderated the influence of the 
political philosophy of individual judges on mixed panels. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
I analyzed the effect of several attributes of a trial judge on whether the 
judge is reversed by the circuit court of appeals. I considered various factors 
including the party of the trial judge, the gender of the trial judge, the type 
of case appealed, and the interactions of these factors. I conducted this 
analysis for the most liberal and the most conservative US courts of appeals 
with the hope of revealing some differences between them. Some 
expectations proved true, others did not, and other unforeseen patterns 
emerged. 
This study concludes that for the full-year data sets analyzed, the Eighth 
Circuit has a political-party bias, while the Ninth Circuit does not. To the 
extent that this phenomenon repeats itself, it is likely reflective of the fact 
that the Eighth Circuit is almost completely Republican, while the Ninth 
Circuit is only marginally Democratic. This difference affects the likelihood 
of getting a panel with judges all from one party and the willingness of the 
appellate judges to take strident positions. The Eighth Circuit’s lack of 
political diversity results in most panels consisting of all Republicans, while 
the Ninth Circuit’s panels are more diverse, both intra-panel and inter-
panel. In addition, the willingness of judges to express strident views is 
positively related to whether the panel is all of one party—an occurrence far 
more likely in the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit pattern provides a 
useful tool in predicting appellate outcomes in that court. 
Both circuits, to varying degrees, reverse fewer criminal cases than civil 
cases. The case type, though, is not the cause of reversal. Rather, because 
convicted criminals have little to lose, and a lot to gain, by appealing, a 
lower percentage of criminal cases—relative to civil cases—warranting 
reversal are appealed, notwithstanding the low likelihood of success. As 
such, this revealed effect does not provide predictive value. 
 
